课程是在网易公开课上的看的
http://open.163.com/special/gametheory/
英文原版视频，相关课件和音频可以从Yale的官方网站下载
http://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159
Lecture 1 Introduction: Five First Lessons
- Don't play a strictly dominated strategy.
- Rational choices can lead to bad outcomes.
- What you want before you try and get what you want.(Payoff matter)
- Put yourself in other peoples shoes to try figure out what they are going to do.
- Yale students are evil.
Lecture 2 Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes
Prisoner's Dilemma
We probably never going to choose weakly dominated strategy.
What are the ingredients of a game?
- players
- strategy (set of strategies)
- pay off
We assume everybody knows the possible strategies everyone could choose.
common knowledge
Lecture 3 - Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem
Iterative deletion of dominated strategies.
Median Voter Theorem.
Best response.
Lecture 4 - Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships
Overview
We continue the idea (from last time) of playing a best response to what we believe others will do. More particularly, we develop the idea that you should not play a strategy that is not a best response for any belief about others' choices. We use this idea to analyze taking a penalty kick in soccer. Then we use it to analyze a profit-sharing partnership. Toward the end, we introduce a new notion: Nash Equilibrium.
注：需要研究下导数的意义和求解方式。
Nash Equilibrium: the players are playing best responses to each other.
Lecture 5 - Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs
Overview
We first define formally the new concept from last time: Nash equilibrium. Then we discuss why we might be interested in Nash equilibrium and how we might find Nash equilibrium in various games. As an example, we play a class investment game to illustrate that there can be many equilibria in social settings, and that societies can fail to coordinate at all or may coordinate on a bad equilibrium. We argue that coordination problems are common in the real world. Finally, we discuss why in such coordination problems--unlike in prisoners' dilemmas--simply communicating may be a remedy.
Lecture 6 - Nash Equilibrium: Dating and Cournot
Overview
We apply the notion of Nash Equilibrium, first, to some more coordination games; in particular, the Battle of the Sexes. Then we analyze the classic Cournot model of imperfect competition between firms. We consider the difficulties in colluding in such settings, and we discuss the welfare consequences of the Cournot equilibrium as compared to monopoly and perfect competition.
Lecture 7 - Nash Equilibrium: Shopping, Standing and Voting on a Line
Overview
We first consider the alternative "Bertrand" model of imperfect competition between two firms in which the firms set prices rather than setting quantities. Then we consider a richer model in which firms still set prices but in which the goods they produce are not identical. We model the firms as stores that are on either end of a long road or line. Customers live along this line. Then we return to models of strategic politics in which it is voters that are spread along a line. This time, however, we do not allow candidates to choose positions: they can only choose whether or not to enter the election. We play this "candidate-voter game" in the class, and we start to analyze both as a lesson about the notion of equilibrium and a lesson about politics.
Lecture 8 - Nash Equilibrium: Location, Segregation and Randomization
Overview
We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schelling's location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, "mixed strategies." Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game.
Lecture 9 - Mixed Strategies in Theory and Tennis
Overview
We continue our discussion of mixed strategies. First we discuss the payoff to a mixed strategy, pointing out that it must be a weighed average of the payoffs to the pure strategies used in the mix. We note a consequence of this: if a mixed strategy is a best response, then all the pure strategies in the mix must themselves be best responses and hence indifferent. We use this idea to find mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in a game within a game of tennis.
Strategy effect VS Direct effect
Lecture 11 - Evolutionary Stability: Cooperation, Mutation, and Equilibrium
Evolutionary Stability are Nash strategies.
Nash strategies are not Evolutionary Stability.
Lecture 12
backward induction
moral hazard
incentive design/clause
piece rates, share cropping
collateral
tree: edge, node, end node, decision node, path
