乔姆斯基与福柯之辩:人性、公正、权力

来源 :乔姆斯基与福柯之辩:人性、公正、权力

视频:http://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTI5MzA5MzI0.html

论人性:公正与权力的对立

Human Nature: Justice versus Power

公正与权力的对立

ELDERS: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the third debate of the International Philosophers' Project. Tonight's debaters are Mr. Michel Foucault, of the College de France, and Mr. Noam Chomsky, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Both philosophers have points in common and points of difference. Perhaps the best way to compare both philosophers would be to see them as tunnellers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other's direction.

埃勒德:女士们、先生们,欢迎各位光临国际哲学规划大会的第三场讨论会。今晚参加讨论的有法兰西学院的米歇尔·福柯先生和麻省理工学院的诺昂·乔姆斯基先生。这两位哲学家的观点既有相同之处也有分歧。或许我们可以把这种情况比做两位开凿山洞的工人,他们手持不同的工具相向工作,并不清楚是否能在洞中相逢。

But both are doing their jobs with quite new ideas, digging as profoundly as possible with an equal commitment in philosophy as in politics: enough reasons, it seems to me for us to expect a fascinating debate about philosophy and about politics.

两位学者以全新的思想指导自己的工作,在哲学和政治领域里力求开凿得尽可能地远。因此我们深信今晚的讨论会一定会引人入胜。

I intend, therefore, not to lose any time and to start off with a central, perennial question: the question of human nature.

闲言少叙。我用一个永恒的、基本的问题开场,即人性问题。

All studies of man, from history to linguistics and psychology, are faced with the question of whether, in the last instance, we are the product of all kinds of external factors, or if, in spite of our differences, we have something we could call a common human nature, by which we can recognise each other as human beings.

所有关于人的研究,从历史到语言学、到心理学,都应解决下面这个问题:我们是由各种外部因素构成的产物还是拥有一个共同的特性?由于此特性,我们才被视为人类。

So my first question is to you Mr. Chomsky, because you often employ the concept of human nature, in which connection you even use terms like "innate ideas" and "innate structures". Which arguments can you derive from linguistics to give such a central position to this concept of human nature?

这个问题是向您,乔姆斯基先生提出来的。因为您经常使用人性这个概念,使用“天赋观念”、“天赋结构”等词语。为了赋予人性概念以中心地位您从语言学中获得了哪些论据?

CHOMSKY: Well, let me begin in a slightly technical way.

乔姆斯基:我先从略带些技术性的方面来回答。

A person who is interested in studying languages is faced with a very definite empirical problem. He's faced with an organism, a mature, let's say adult, speaker, who has somehow acquired an amazing range of abilities, which enable him in particular to say what he means, to understand what people say to him, to do this in a fashion that I think is proper to call highly creative ... that is, much of what a person says in his normal intercourse with others is novel, much of what you hear is new, it doesn't bear any close resemblance to anything in your experience; it's not random novel behaviour, clearly, it's behaviour which is in some sense which is very hard to characterise, appropriate to situations. And in fact it has many of the characteristics of what I think might very well be called creativity.

一个对语言学研究感兴趣的人会面对一个特别典型的经验论问题。他发现在他面前有一个有机体,即一个成年对话者。由于获得了非凡的能力使得他能够阐明自己的思想、理解别人的话语,并且以一种我认为具有高度创造性的方式做出了这一切……因为一个人在谈话中所说的大部分东西是新的,而我们所听到的大部分东西也是新的,只有极少一部分同我们的经历相类似。这种行为决非偶然,它以一种难以描绘的方式适应环境。事实上,它同被称之为创造性的东西有许多相同点。

Now, the person who has acquired this intricate and highly articulated and organised collection of abilities-the collection of abilities that we call knowing a language-has been exposed to a certain experience; he has been presented in the course of his lifetime with a certain amount of data, of direct experience with a language.

能够驾驶这种复杂的、极清晰和有条理的整体,并具有我们称之为语言知识的人,便具有了一定的经验。在他的人生历程中,他曾置身于某些材料之中,有着语言的直接感受。

We can investigate the data that's available to this person; having done so, in principle, we're faced with a reasonably clear and well-delineated scientific problem, namely that of accounting for the gap between the really quite small quantity of data, small and rather degenerate in quality, that's presented to the child, and the very highly articulated, highly systematic, profoundly organised resulting knowledge that he somehow derives from these data.

如果我们观察一下他最后拥有的基本概念(注:此句中的“最后”不知从何而来),我们就会面对一个十分确切的科学问题:如何解释横在孩子获得的质差量少的材料与以某种方式从基本概念中派生出来的、经过深层组织的、有系统的知识之间的距离呢?(注:这段和上段最后一句中的data,一会被翻为“材料”,一会被翻为“基本概念”,只看译文的话实在不知所云)

Furthermore we notice that varying individuals with very varied experience in a particular language nevertheless arrive at systems which are very much congruent to one another. The systems that two speakers of English arrive at on the basis of their very different experiences are congruent in the sense that, over an overwhelming range, what one of them says, the other can understand.

进一步说,操着某种语言的、经历各异的不同个体最终仍会达到相互极为和谐的系统。两个英语对话者从各自不同的经历出发会达互和谐的系统,从广义来说就是一个刚说出话来,另一个便马上会理解。

Furthermore, even more remarkable, we notice that in a wide range of languages, in fact all that have been studied seriously, there are remarkable limitations on the kind of systems that emerge from the very different kinds of experiences to which people are exposed.

而更令人注意的是,人们发现从语言的广度来看,就是进行过认真研究的所有范围来看,出自人们亲身经历的系统服从于一些明确的限制。

There is only one possible explanation, which I have to give in a rather schematic fashion, for this remarkable phenomenon, namely the assumption that the individual himself contributes a good deal, an overwhelming part in fact, of the general schematic structure and perhaps even of the specific content of the knowledge that he ultimately derives from this very scattered and limited experience.

对这个令人瞩目的现象,只存在一种可能的解释。我简略地谈一下。根据假设,一个人把大部分精力投于到整体结构的转换上,(注:“转换”一词也不知是如何译出的)也许还投入到知识的特殊内容上,这是从他零散的、有限的经历中最后得到的。

A person who knows a language has acquired that knowledge because he approached the learning experience with a very explicit and detailed schematism that tells him what kind of language it is that he is being exposed to. That is, to put it rather loosely: the child must begin with the knowledge, certainly not with the knowledge that he's hearing English or Dutch or French or something else, but he does start with the knowledge that he's hearing a human language of a very narrow and explicit type, that permits a very small range of variation. And it is because he begins with that highly organised and very restrictive schematism, that he is able to make the huge leap from scattered and degenerate data to highly organised knowledge. And furthermore I should add that we can go a certain distance, I think a rather long distance, towards presenting the properties of this system of knowledge, that I would call innate language or instinctive knowledge, that the child brings to language learning; and also we can go a long way towards describing the system that is mentally represented when he has acquired this knowledge.

掌握一种语言的人通过学习明晰、具体的模式便拥有了这种学问,它起着某种类似于法典的作用(“法典的作用”的表述有些含糊)。或者,用不那么准确的话说:孩子学习语言并不是从模仿听到的英语、法语或荷兰语起步的,而是从明白这是一种明确的、须臾不可离的人类语言开始的。这是因为他从一个既有条理又有约束的模式出发,因而有能力通过散乱、贫乏的材料达到高度条理化的知识。再补充一点,在知识体系的特性方面(我称之为天赋语言或本能知识,它是孩子学习语言时具有的能力),我们能够走得更远。

I would claim then that this instinctive knowledge, if you like, this schematism that makes it possible to derive complex and intricate knowledge on the basis of very partial data, is one fundamental constituent of human nature. In this case I think a fundamental constituent because of the role that language plays, not merely in communication, but also in expression of thought and interaction between persons; and I assume that in other domains of human intelligence, in other domains of human cognition and behaviour, something of the same sort must be true.

我认为,这种本能的知识,或更确切地说,这种依据很不完全的材料获得复杂知识的模式,是人性的基本构成部分。说它是基本构成部分是因为语言不仅在交际中起作用,在思想表达和个体之间的相互影响中都起作用。我设想在智慧、知识和人类行为等其他领域也有相同的事情。

Well, this collection, this mass of schematisms, innate organising principles, which guides our social and intellectual and individual behaviour, that's what I mean to refer to by the concept of human nature.

这个模式整体,这些天赋组织原则,指导着我们的社会行为、智力行为和个人行为。这就是当我涉及人性概念时要特别指出的。

ELDERS: Well, Mr. Foucault, when I think of your books like The History of Madness and Words and Objects, I get the impression that you are working on a completely different level and with a totally opposite aim and goal; when I think of the word schematism in relation to human nature, I suppose you are trying to elaborate several periods with several schematisms. What do you say to this?

埃勒德:那么,福柯先生,我想起您的《疯狂史》或《词与物》。我的感觉是您研究的层次与乔姆斯基先生不同,您的目标也与之完全对立。我想,您试图按阶段为这个同人性有关联的模式论增添色彩。对此您想说什么呢?

FOUCAULT: Well, if you don't mind I will answer in French, because my English is so poor that I would be ashamed of answering in English.

福柯:如果你们不厌烦的话,我要用法语回答问题。因为我的英语很差,羞于使用它。

It is true that I mistrust the notion of human nature a little, and for the following reason: I believe that of the concepts or notions which a science can use, not all have the same degree of elaboration, and that in general they have neither the same function nor the same type of possible use in scientific discourse. Let's take the example of biology. You will find concepts with a classifying function, concepts with a differentiating function, and concepts with an analytical function: some of them enable us to characterise objects, for example that of "tissue"; others to isolate elements, like that of "hereditary feature"; others to fix relations, such as that of "reflex". There are at the same time elements which play a role in the discourse and in the internal rules of the reasoning practice. But there also exist "peripheral" notions, those by which scientific practice designates itself, differentiates itself in relation to other practices, delimits its domain of objects, and designates what it considers to be the totality of its future tasks. The notion of life played this role to some extent in biology during a certain period.

的确,我有些怀疑人性这个观念,原因如下:我认为一门学科能够使用的概念或观念并不具有同一设计标准。一般来说,在科学讨论中,它们既没有相同的功能,也不属同一可使用类型。以生物学为例,某些概念具有分类学功能,而另一些则有分化或分析功能;有些可以从组织角度使我们确定对象,而另一些如遗传性则分离各个元素,还有一些起反射作用。(注:这句翻得走样了)同时,有些因素在讨论中以及在推理实验的内在规律里都起作用。但同时还存在着边缘观念,科学实践正是通过边缘观念得以确认、得以区别于其他类型的实践、得以界定自己的领域及规划出未来的总体任务。在既定的时期内,生命观念在生物学中便起着这种作用。

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the notion of life was hardly used in studying nature: one classified natural beings, whether living or non-living, in a vast hierarchical tableau which went from minerals to man; the break between the minerals and the plants or animals was relatively undecided; epistemologically it was only important to fix their positions once and for all in an indisputable way.

17、18世纪时,生命观念在自然科学研究中几乎不被使用。在从矿物到人的庞大分类表中,人们只列出了有生命的自然物和非生命自然物体。那时矿物同植物或动物的区分相对来说是含糊的。从知识论的角度看,应当为它们一锤定音,唯一要注意的是以无可争议的方式做这件事。

At the end of the eighteenth century, the description and analysis of these natural beings showed, through the use of more highly perfected instruments and the latest techniques, an entire domain of objects, an entire field of relations and processes which have enabled us to define the specificity of biology in the knowledge of nature. Can one say that research into life has finally constituted itself in biological science? Has the concept of life been responsible for the organisation of biological knowledge? I don't think so. It seems to me more likely that the transformations of biological knowledge at the end of the eighteenth century, were demonstrated on one hand by a whole series of new concepts for use in scientific discourse and on the other hand gave rise to a notion like that of life which has enabled us to designate, to delimit and to situate a certain type of scientific discourse, among other things. I would say that the notion of life is not a scientific concept; it has been an epistemological indicator of which the classifying, delimiting and other functions had an effect on scientific discussions, and not on what they were talking about:

18世纪末,由于先进的工具和新技术的出现,对这些自然存在物的描写及分析展示出一个完整的课题领域,一个在对自然的认识中使我们能够确定生物学特征的程序和关系范围。能肯定地说对生命的研究最终构成了生物学吗?生命概念是生物学知识结构的成因吗?我不这么想。很有可能在18世纪末出现了生物知识的转化。这归功于出现了一系列科学词汇构成的新概念,而它们又导致像生命这类观念的诞生,这使我们能够在其他事物中指明、界定和置放这类词汇。依我看,生命观念不是一个科学概念,而是一个起分类、区别作用的知识指示器,它的功能作用于科学词汇而非客体。

Well, it seems to me that the notion of human nature is of the same type. It was not by studying human nature that linguists discovered the laws of consonant mutation, or Freud the principles of the analysis of dreams, or cultural anthropologists the structure of myths. In the history of knowledge, the notion of human nature seems to me mainly to have played the role of an epistemological indicator to designate certain types of discourse in relation to or in opposition to theology or biology or history. I would find it difficult to see in this a scientific concept.

我觉得人性观念也属这一类型。语言学家并不是在研究人性时发现了协韵规律(注:consonant mutation是指辅音变化,怎么扯成“协韵”了),弗洛伊德的梦幻分析原则、文化人类学的神话结构也都如此。在认识史中,我感觉似乎人性观念主要起了知识指示器的作用,同时用以指明某些类型的词汇与神学、生物学或史学有关联或与之相对立,很难认为它是一个科学概念。

CHOMSKY: Well, in the first place, if we were able to specify in terms of, let's say, neural networks the properties of human cognitive structure that make it possible for the child to acquire these complicated systems, then I at least would have no hesitation in describing those properties as being a constituent element of human nature. That is, there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation for whatever it is that we do with our mental capacities in this case.

乔姆斯基:那么,首先,如果我们能用神经元网术语详细说明人类认知结构的属性,它使儿童获得复杂系统,我便毫不犹豫地认同这些属性是人性的构成部分。世上存在一种无变化的生物元素,在此情况下这是我们的官能赖以运作的基础。

But I would like to pursue a little further the line of development that you outlined, with which in fact I entirely agree, about the concept of life as an organising concept in the biological sciences.

我想进一步追述您的思想发展。生命概念在生物学科里是一个组织概念,对此我完全赞同。

It seems to me that one might speculate a bit further speculate in this case, since we're talking about the future, not the past-and ask whether the concept of human nature or of innate organising mechanisms or of intrinsic mental schematism or whatever we want to call it, I don't see much difference between them, but let's call it human nature for shorthand, might not provide for biology the next peak to try to scale, after having-at least in the minds of the biologists, though one might perhaps question this-already answered to the satisfaction of some the question of what is life.

我觉得我看不出人性概念、组织的天赋机理概念或者内在精神模式概念之间的差别,我指的是将来而非过去。简言之就定为人性吧。在以某些人满意的方式为生命下了定义后,它也不可能构成生物学的未来阶段。至少在一些生物学家看来,这一点还远未使人信服。

In other words, to be precise, is it possible to give a biological explanation or a physical explanation...is it possible to characterise, in terms of the physical concepts presently available to us, the ability of the child to acquire complex systems of knowledge; and furthermore, critically, having acquired such systems of knowledge, to make use of this knowledge in the free and creative and remarkably varied ways in which he does?

为了更准确些,换个词汇(注:通常都翻成“换句话说”吧),难道不能用生物学或物理学方面的解释?难道不能根据我们所掌握的物理概念来描绘儿童获取知识的复杂系统能力的特点?描绘儿童今后用一种自由的、创造性的、多要的方式运用这种知识的能力?

Can we explain in biological terms, ultimately in physical terms, these properties of both acquiring knowledge in the first place and making use of it in the second? I really see no reason to believe that we can; that is, it's an article of faith on the part of scientists that since science has explained many other things it will also explain this.

能否用生物学词汇,最终用物理学词汇来解释获取知识和运用知识的能力?我找不出理由认为我们可以做到这一点。这涉及到科学家追求的信念问题:既然科学已经解释了若干事物,它将同样能够解决这个问题。

In a sense one might say that this is a variant of the body/mind problem. But if we look back at the way in which science has scaled various peaks, and at the way in which the concept of life was finally acquired by science after having been beyond its vision for a long period, then I think we notice at many points in history-and in fact the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are particularly clear examples-that scientific advances were possible precisely because the domain of physical science was itself enlarged. Classic cases are Newton's gravitational forces. To the Cartesians, action at a distance was a mystical concept, and in fact to Newton himself it was an occult quality, a mystical entity, which didn't belong within science. To the common sense of a later generation, action at a distance has been incorporated within science.

从某种意义上来自,可以说这涉及人体-精神问题的变种。如果回想一下科学跨越各个阶段的方法和它最终获得生命概念(这个概念曾长斯被忽视)的方法,我们便会注意到在历史的众多阶段科学的进步十分明显。17、18世纪尤为突出,物理学领域此时大为扩展,牛顿万有引力的威力是典型事例。笛卡尔主义者认为远距离作用是神秘概念,而在牛顿看来这是具有玄奥性、是不属于科学的神秘实体。对于后来的科学家,远距离作用理所当然属于科学范畴。

What happened was that the notion of body, the notion of the physical had changed. To a Cartesian, a strict Cartesian, if such a person appeared today, it would appear that there is no explanation for the behaviour of the heavenly bodies. Certainly there is no explanation for the phenomena that are explained in terms of electro-magnetic force, let's say. But by the extension of physical science to incorporate hitherto unavailable concepts, entirely new ideas, it became possible to successively build more and more complicated structures that incorporated a larger range of phenomena.

认为人体观念是物理学范畴的时代已经过去了。对于标准的笛卡尔主义者来说——如果今日还存在这样一位人士的话——天堂里人体的行为是不可解释的。他肯定对用电磁力词汇阐述一些奇异现象也无能为力。多亏物理科学的发展,它吸收了一些被排斥在外的概念、全新的思想,成为可以创立越来越复杂的结构、包含越来越多的现象的学科。

For example, it's certainly not true that the physics of the Cartesians is able to explain, let's say, the behaviour of elementary particles in physics, just as it's unable to explain the concepts of life.

例如,笛卡尔主义者的物理学肯定不能解释基本粒子的活动,也不能解释生命概念。

Similarly, I think, one might ask the question whether physical science as known today, including biology, incorporates within itself the principles and the concepts that will enable it to give an account of innate human intellectual capacities and, even more profoundly, of the ability to make use of those capacities under conditions of freedom in the way which humans do. I see no particular reason to believe that biology or physics now contain those concepts, and it may be that to scale the next peak, to make the next step, they will have to focus on this organising concept, and may very well have to broaden their scope in order to come to grips with it.

我想,同样可以提出这样一个问题,即,我们今天所了解的物理科学,也包括生物学,能否吸收这样的一些原则和概念,它们能阐述人类天赋的智慧?更深入一步,就是分析在人类享有自由的条件下使用这种能力的可能性。没有任何理由认为生物学或物理学包含这些概念。为了跨入未来阶段,生物学和物理学可能应该思考组织的概念并扩展它们的领域以便最终占领它们。

FOUCAULT: Yes.

福柯:是的。

ELDERS: Perhaps I may try to ask one more specific question leading out of both your answers, because I'm afraid otherwise the debate will become too technical. I have the impression that one of the main differences between you both has its origin in a difference in approach. You, Mr. Foucault, are especially interested in the way science or scientists function in a certain period, whereas Mr. Chomsky is more interested in the so-called "what-questions": why we possess language; not just how language functions, but what's the reason for our having language. We can try to elucidate this in a more general way: you, Mr. Foucault, are delimiting eighteenth century rationalism, whereas you, Mr. Chomsky, are combining eighteenth-century rationalism with notions like freedom and creativity.

埃勒德:根据两位的回答,我想提一个比较特殊的问题。因为我担心讨论会变得太技术化了。我的印象是你们两位之间主要分歧之一源于解决的方式。您,福柯先生,主要对科学或科学家在既定时期内运作的方式感兴趣,而乔姆斯基先生更关注“为什么”这个问题:为什么我们掌握语言?您关心的并不仅仅是语言如何运作,而且关心基于何种原因我们得以享用它。可以尝试用普通方法弄清这一点:您,福柯先生,界定一下18世纪的唯理主义,而乔姆斯基先生则把它同诸如自由和创造性等观念协调起来。

Perhaps we could illustrate this in a more general way with examples from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

也许用17、18世纪的例子更能通俗地阐明这一点。

CHOMSKY: Well, first I should say that I approach classical rationalism not really as a historian of science or a historian of philosophy, but from the rather different point of view of someone who has a certain range of scientific notions and is interested in seeing how at an earlier stage people may have been groping towards these notions, possibly without even realising what they were groping towards.

乔姆斯基:首先声明我对待古典唯理主义的态度有别于科学史学家或哲学史学家。作为一个个有某些科学观念的人,我希望发现在历史的一个阶段人们用何种方法无意识地朝着这些观念摸索前进。

So one might say that I'm looking at history not as an antiquarian, who is interested in finding out and giving a precisely accurate account of what the thinking of the seventeenth century was-I don't mean to demean that activity, it's just not mine-but rather from the point of view of, let's say, an art lover, who wants to look at the seventeenth century to find in it things that are of particular value, and that obtain part of their value in part because of the perspective with which he approaches them.

可以说我不像考古学家那样对待历史,他们期望能准确地描绘出17世纪的思想。我决不想降低这种行为的价值,只不过说明这不是我的做法。我像一个钟爱艺术的情人(注:art lover分明是“艺术爱好者”,怎么变“情人”了),他研究17世纪是为了从中发现有特殊价值的事物,这是一种因他投去的目光而获新生的价值。

And I think that, without objecting to the other approach, my approach is legitimate; that is, I think it is perfectly possible to go back to earlier stages of scientific thinking on the basis of our present understanding, and to perceive how great thinkers were, within the limitations of their time, groping towards concepts and ideas and insights that they themselves could not be clearly aware of.

与第一种解决方法不矛盾,我想我的观点是在情理之中的,我认为完全有可能以我们目前的理解能力重现科学思想的历史阶段,明白那些大思想家如何摸索着迈向这些概念和思想,他们对此几乎没有意识并受到时代的局限。

For example, I think that anyone can do this about his own thought. Without trying to compare oneself to the great thinkers of the past, anyone can. .

比如我想无论何人都可以借此方法分析自己的思想。并不是想同那些大思想家做对比、无论谁都可以……

ELDERS: Why not?

埃勒德:为什么不能比呢?

CHOMSKY: ...look at...

乔姆斯基:考虑……

ELDERS: Why not?

埃勒德:为什么不呢?

CHOMSKY: All right [laughs], anyone can consider what he now knows and can ask what he knew twenty years ago, and can see that in some unclear fashion he was striving towards something which he can only now understand ... if he is fortunate.

乔姆斯基:很好,无论什么人都可以思索今天他明白的东西,琢磨20年前他懂得的事物和看到他曾模模糊糊地想搞清楚的事情直到现在才明白……如果他有此幸运的话。

Similarly I think it's possible to look at the past, without distorting your view, and it is in these terms that I want to look at the seventeenth century. Now, when I look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, what strikes me particularly is the way in which, for example, Descartes and his followers were led to postulate mind as a thinking substance independent of the body. If you look at their reasons for postulating this second substance, mind, thinking entity, they were that Descartes was able to convince himself, rightly or wrongly, it doesn't matter at the moment, that events in the physical world and even much of the behavioural and psychological world, for example a good deal of sensation, were explicable in terms of what he considered to be physics-wrongly, as we now believe-that is, in terms of things bumping into each other and turning and moving and so on.

同样我想在保持正确观念的情况下,我们可以看看过去。我就是抱着这种态度看待17世纪的。当我转向17、18世纪时,我被大思想家的探索方法深深吸引。比如笛卡尔和他的弟子们在认定精神是独立于肉体的、能思想的物质时的方法。如果分析一下他们假设精神为第二物质、是能思想的物质的理由时,显然笛卡尔最终相信——对错与否并不重要——物理领域的事情以及行为和心理领域的大部分事物,尤其是感觉,是依据他心目中物理的模式表达出来的:相互移动、碰撞的物体产生对抗等等。——今天我们认为这是错误的方法。

He thought that in those terms, in terms of the mechanical principle, he could explain a certain domain of phenomena; and then he observed that there was a range of phenomena that he argued could not be explained in those terms. And he therefore postulated a creative principle to account for that domain of phenomena, the principle of mind with its own properties. And then later followers, many who didn't regard themselves as Cartesians, for example many who regarded themselves as strongly anti-rationalistic, developed the concept of creation within a system of rule.

他相信这种机械原则能使他阐明某些现象。随后,他发现并不能总是如愿以偿,于是他便假设了创造原则,即精神原则及其特性。在他之后,他的弟子们,其中不乏自称非笛卡尔主义者、坚定的反唯理主义者,他们的规则体系内发展了创造概念。

I won't bother with the details, but my own research into the subject led me ultimately to Wilhelm von Humboldt, who certainly didn't consider himself a Cartesian, but nevertheless in a rather different framework and within a different historical period and with different insight, in a remarkable and ingenious way, which, I think, is of lasting importance, also developed the concept of internalised form-fundamentally the concept of free creation within a system of rule in an effort to come to grips with some of the same difficulties and problems that the Cartesians faced in their terms.

我不细说了。但对这方面的研究最后将我引向了威廉·冯·洪堡。当然他也不认为自己是笛卡尔主义者,但他以独特的方式,在不同的历史阶段发展了内在形式概念。他采用独特的结构、新颖的观点,以工程师的方法——我认为这是必不可少的和持久的方式——发展了这个概念,这就是在通常体系内自由创造的概念。他努力地解决了一些笛卡尔主义者与之奋斗不息的困难和问题。

Now I believe, and here I would differ from a lot of my colleagues, that the move of Descartes to the postulation of a second substance was a very scientific move; it was not a metaphysical or an anti-scientific move. In fact, in many ways it was very much like Newton's intellectual move when he postulated action at a distance; he was moving into the domain of the occult, if you like. He was moving into the domain of something that went beyond well-established science, and was trying to integrate it with well-established science by developing a theory in which these notions could be properly clarified and explained.

同我的许多同事相反,到目前为止,我认为笛卡尔假设第二实体的选择具有科学性,决不是形而上学。在许多方面这类似于牛顿确定远距离作用时的理智选择,但他进入了玄奥领域——怎么说都可以。他进入了超越既定科学的领域,试图发展一个理论,用这个理论恰如其分地、清晰地阐述这些概念,以便反它们纳入科学领域。

Now Descartes, I think, made a similar intellectual move in postulating a second substance. Of course he failed where Newton succeeded; that is, he was unable to lay the groundwork for a mathematical theory of mind, as achieved by Newton and his followers, which laid the groundwork for a mathematical theory of physical entities that incorporated such occult notions as action at a distance and later electromagnetic forces and so on.

笛卡尔用类似的方法确立了第二实体。当然他在牛顿成功的地方失败了。在建立精神数学理论的基础方面他显得无能为力。牛顿和他的弟子们建立了物理实体的数学理论基础,这个基础囊括了玄奥概念、远距离作用及后来的电磁力等。

But then that poses for us, I think, the task of carrying on and developing this, if you like, mathematical theory of mind; by that I simply mean a precisely articulated, clearly formulated, abstract theory which will have empirical consequences, which will let us know whether the theory is right or wrong, or on the wrong track or the right track, and at the same time will have the properties of mathematical science, that is, the properties of rigour and precision and a structure that makes it possible for us to deduce conclusions from assumptions and so on.

于是,不管怎么说,我们负有发展精神数学理论的任务。在此,我的意思是一个结构严谨、表达明确的抽象理论会有知识的结果,能够使我们明白理论正确与否、方向正确与否,并同时具有数学科学的特性、严格性、精确性及结构,使我们能从中获得结论、假说等等。

Now it's from that point of view that I try to look back at the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and to pick out points, which I think are really there, even though I certainly recognise, and in fact would want to insist, that the individuals in question may not have seen it this way.

基于这种观点我尝试着观察17、18世纪,以便从中发现业已存在的一些概念。尽管必须承认,我谈到的有关人士并不这样看待17、18世纪。

ELDERS: Mr. Foucault, I suppose you will have a severe criticism of this?

埃勒德:福柯先生,我想您要严厉地批评这些想法了?

FOUCAULT: No ... there are just one or two little historical points. I cannot object to the account which you have given in your historical analysis of their reasons and of their modality. But there is one thing one could nevertheless add: when you speak of creativity as conceived by Descartes, I wonder if you don't transpose to Descartes an idea which is to be found among his successors or even certain of his contemporaries. According to Descartes, the mind was not so very creative. It saw, it perceived, it was illuminated by the evidence.

福柯:不……仅仅在历史问题上有一两处微不足道的看法。对您的分析我没有相反意见,但我想补充一点:当您谈到类似于笛卡尔构思的创造性时,我想是否您把他的后继者,甚至他的同代人的想法都归于笛卡尔了?笛卡尔认为精神并不十分具有创造性。他观察、思索(“他”应为“它”,指的是精神),从显而易见的事物中得到启示。

Moreover, the problem which Descartes never resolved nor entirely mastered, was that of understanding how one could pass from one of these clear and distinct ideas, one of these intuitions, to another, and what status should be given to the evidence of the passage between them. I can't see exactly either the creation in the moment where the mind grasped the truth for Descartes, or even the real creation in the passage from one truth to another.

此外,笛卡尔从未解决或从未完全掌握的问题是搞清楚人们如何从一个明晰的思想过渡到另一思想,从一个直觉过渡到另一直觉,并赋予这种明显的过渡以何种规则。不管是在笛卡尔认为的精神掌握了真理的时刻,还是在从一个真理转向另一个真理的过程中,我都看不到创造性。

On the contrary, you can find, I think, at the same time in Pascal and Leibniz, something which is much closer to what you are looking for: in other words in Pascal and in the whole Augustinian stream of Christian thought, you find this idea of a mind in profundity; of a mind folded back in the intimacy of itself which is touched by a sort of unconsciousness, and which can develop its potentialities by the deepening of the self. And that is why the grammar of Port Royal, to which you refer, is, I think, much more Augustinian than Cartesian.

相反,在同时期的帕斯卡或莱布尼茨处会找到非常接近您需要的东西。换句话说,在帕斯卡那里以及基督教思想的奥古斯丁学说里都能找到深邃的精神思想、隐藏在自身深处的精神思想。当它被某种无意识触及,便通过自身的深化可以发展它的潜在力量。因此您参用的波特罗亚尔的《语法》,据我看,与其说它是笛卡尔主义的,不如说是奥古斯丁学派的。

And furthermore you will find in Leibniz something which you will certainly like: the idea that in the profundity of the mind is incorporated a whole web of logical relations which constitutes, in a certain sense, the rational unconscious of the consciousness, the not yet clarified and visible form of the reason itself, which the monad or the individual develops little by little, and with which he understands the whole world.

另外,莱布尼茨那里肯定也有使您感兴趣的东西:在精神深处含有一张逻辑关系网。从某种意义上来说,它构成了合理的无意识,构成了看得见却还模糊的理性形态,单子或个体逐渐地发展它,对整个世界的理解也依赖于它。

That's where I would make a very small criticism.

这是我的一点小意见。

ELDERS: Mr. Chomsky, one moment please.

埃勒德:乔姆斯基先生,请稍等一下。

I don't think it's a question of making a historical criticism, but of formulating your own opinions on these quite fundamental concepts...

我不认为有必要做历史方面的评论。我们希望听到您对基本概念的看法。

FOUCAULT: But one's fundamental opinions can be demonstrated in precise analyses such as these.

福柯:可是我们的基本观点需要在准确的分析里被展示,就像刚才谈到的那些。

ELDERS: Yes, all right. But I remember some passages in your History of Madness, which give a description of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in terms of repression, suppression and exclusion, while for Mr. Chomsky this period is full of creativity and individuality.

埃勒德:是的,很好。但我记得在您的《疯狂史》里有几处描写17、18世纪的段落,您使用了镇压、消灭和排斥等字眼;而在乔姆斯基先生看来,这是一个充满创造力和人性的时期。

Why do we have at that period, for the first time, closed psychiatric or insane asylums? I think this is a very fundamental question...

为什么在这个时期开始出现了拘留所?我想这是个重要问题……

FOUCAULT: ...on creativity, yes!

福柯:……对于创造性来说,是应充分肯定的!

But I don't know, perhaps Mr. Chomsky would like to speak about it...

但我不清楚。也许乔姆斯基先生想就此谈谈……

ELDERS: No, no, no, please go on. Continue.

埃勒德:不,不,不,请您接下去说。

FOUCAULT: No, I would like to say this: in the historical studies that I have been able to make, or have tried to make, I have without any doubt given very little room to what you might call the creativity of individuals, to their capacity for creation, to their aptitude for inventing by themselves, for originating concepts, theories or scientific truths by themselves.

福柯:我只想简单地说一下。在我所能做的或我曾努力做的历史研究中,毫无疑问,在被你们称之为个体创造能力方面及他们发明概念、理论或科学真理的才能方面,我留下的地方很小。

But I believe that my problem is different to that of Mr. Chomsky. Mr. Chomsky has been fighting against linguistic behaviourism, which attributed almost nothing to the creativity of the speaking subject; the speaking subject was a kind of surface on which information came together little by little, which he afterwards combined.

我认为构的问题与乔姆斯基先生的有所不同。他是反对语言行为主义的,因为语言行为主义否定语言主体的创造性,认为语言主体是承载逐渐汇集起来的信息并随后加以组合的一种截面。

In the field of the history of science or, more generally, the history of thought, the problem was completely different.

在科学史领域内,或更广泛地说,在思想史领域内,问题则完全不同。

The history of knowledge has tried for a long time to obey two claims. One is the claim of attribution: each discovery should not only be situated and dated, but should also be attributed to someone; it should have an inventor and someone responsible for it. General or collective phenomena on the other hand, those which by definition can't be "attributed", are normally devalued: they are still traditionally described through words like "tradition', "mentality", "modes"; and one lets them play the negative role of a brake in relation to the "originality" of the inventor. In brief, this has to do with the principle of the sovereignty of the subject applied to the history of knowledge. The other claim is that which no longer allows us to save the subject, but the truth: so that it won't be compromised by history, it is necessary not that the truth constitutes itself in history, but only that it reveals itself in it; hidden to men's eyes, provisionally inaccessible, sitting in the shadows, it will wait to be unveiled. The history of truth would be essentially its delay, its fall or the disappearance of the obstacles which have impeded it until now from coming to light. The historical dimension of knowledge is always negative in relation to the truth. It isn't difficult to see how these two claims were adjusted, one to the other: the phenomena of collective order, the "common thought", the "prejudices" of the "myths" of a period, constituted the obstacles which the subject of knowledge had to surmount or to outlive in order to have access finally to the truth; he had to be in an "eccentric" position in order to "discover". At one level this seems to be invoking a certain "romanticism" about the history of science: the solitude of the man of truth, the originality which reopened itself onto the original through history and despite it. I think that, more fundamentally, it's a matter of superimposing the theory of knowledge and the subject of knowledge on the history of knowledge.

认识史长斯以来致力于服从两个需求。首先是授予的需求;每项发明不仅需要确定时间、地点,而且还要确定授予何人。它需要一位发明者,一位它的负责人。普通的或集体的项目由于不能授予的特性而自然贬值。通常都用类似于“传统”、“思想”和“方式”等字词来描述,因而只能起到受抑制的负作用,根本无法与发明者的“独创性”相比。简言之,这与认识史上的主体至高无上原则有关。第二个需求,它不允许挽救主体,而要挽救真理。为了不让真理被历史左右,真理不必非在历史中构成不可,而仅仅在其中显露而已。它蜷缩在阴影里,躲开众人的目光,令人一时难以接近,它等待着被揭示。真理的历史主要的就是真理的姗姗来迟,它的失败,或者去消灭目前仍阻挡它进入光明的各种障碍。与真理相比,认识史的重要性总是被否定的。不难看出这两个需求紧密交错:类型相同的现象、相同的思想、对一个时期幻想的偏见,构成了诸多障碍。认识科学应当克服这些障碍以便最终进入真理,并应当位于中心位置之外以显露自己。从某种程度上来说,这似乎带给科学史某种浪漫情调;掌握真理之人的孤独、创造性不经意地从历史中寻到了它的根。我想,更基本的应把认识的理论和认识的主体放进认识的历史中。

And what if understanding the relation of the subject to the truth, were just an effect of knowledge? What if understanding were a complex, multiple, non-individual formation, not "subjected to the subject", which produced effects of truth? One should then put forward positively this entire dimension which the history of science has negativised; analyse the productive capacity of knowledge as a collective practice; and consequently replace individuals and their "knowledge" in the development of a knowledge which at a given moment functions according to certain rules which one can register and describe.

理解主体与真理的关系是否仅是认识的作用呢?理解是不是一种复杂、多样的构成?是不是非个人的、独立于主体及能够产生真理的作用呢?那就该对它的重要性予以肯定,这一点是科学史曾予扬弃的。应该把知识的生产能力作为集体实践来分析,并在知识发展中重新安排个体及他们的知识的位置。在既定时刻,知识发展依据某些规则运作,人们可以记录和描绘这些规则。

You will say to me that all the Marxist historians of science have been doing this for a long time. But when one sees how they work with these facts and especially what use they make of the notions of consciousness, of ideology as opposed to science, one realises that they are for the main part more or less detached from the theory of knowledge.

你们会说马克思主义的科学史学家早就做这项工作了。但当看清他们是如何对待这些事实,尤其是他们用觉悟和意识形态同科学相对立的方法,大家就会清楚他们或多或少脱离了认识理论。

In any case, what I am anxious about is substituting transformations of the understanding for the history of the discoveries of knowledge. Therefore I have, in appearance at least, a completely different attitude to Mr. Chomsky apropos creativity, because for me it is a matter of effacing the dilemma of the knowing subject, while for him it is a matter of allowing the dilemma of the speaking subject to reappear.

至于我,我尤为关注的是用理解转换来替代认识的发明史。这样,至少在表面上我同乔姆斯基先生在对待创造性上有天壤之别。因为在我这里是消除认识主体的窘况,而他呢,是希望再现语言主体的窘况。

But if he has made it reappear, if he has described it, it is because he can do so. The linguists have for a long time now analysed language as a system with a collective value. The understanding as a collective totality of rules allowing such and such a knowledge to be produced in a certain period, has hardly been studied until now. Nevertheless, it presents some fairly positive characteristics to the observer. Take for example medicine at the end of the eighteenth century: read twenty medical works, it doesn't matter which, of the years 1770 to 1780, then twenty others from the years 1820 to 1830, and I would say, quite at random, that in forty or fifty years everything had changed; what one talked about, the way one talked about it, not just the remedies, of course, not just the maladies and their classifications, but the outlook itself. Who was responsible for that? Who was the author of it? It is artificial, I think, to say Bichat, or even to expand a little and to say the first anatomical clinicians. It's a matter of a collective and complex transformation of medical understanding in its practice and its rules. And this transformation is far from a negative phenomenon: it is the suppression of a negativity, the effacement of an obstacle, the disappearance of prejudices, the abandonment of old myths, the retreat of irrational beliefs, and access finally freed to experience and to reason; it represents the application of an entirely new grille, with its choices and exclusions; a new play with its own rules, decisions and limitations, with its own inner logic, its parameters and its blind alleys, all of which lead to the modification of the point of origin. And it is in this functioning that the understanding itself exists. So, if one studies the history of knowledge, one sees that there are two broad directions of analysis: according to one, one has to show how, under what conditions and for what reasons, the understanding modifies itself in its formative rules, without passing through an original "inventor" discovering the "truth"; and according to the other, one has to show how the working of the rules of an understanding can produce in an individual new and unpublished knowledge. Here my aim rejoins, with imperfect methods and in a quite inferior mode, Mr. Chomsky's project: accounting for the fact that with a few rules or definite elements, unknown totalities, never even produced, can be brought to light by individuals. To resolve this problem, Mr. Chomsky has to reintroduce the dilemma of the subject in the field of grammatical analysis. To resolve an analogous problem in the field of history with which I am involved, one has to do the opposite, in a way: to introduce the point of view of understanding, of its rules, of its systems, of its transformations of totalities in the game of individual knowledge. Here and there the problem of creativity cannot be resolved in the same way, or rather, it can't be formulated in the same terms, given the state of disciplines inside which it is put.

他做到了这一点,因为这是可行的。长期以来语言学家们分析语言如同分析具有共同价值的一个系统。理解作为规则的共同总体性允许这种或那种认识进入某个时期,但直到目前却从未被研究过。但理解表现出了一些正面的特征,举18世纪末医学界为例。随便翻开一本1770年至1780年的医书,读上二十几页;然后再看二十几页1820年至1830年的一本医书。经过四、五十年后发生了巨大的变化。无论人们谈及的内容还是说话的方式,当然不仅仅是药方,也不仅仅是疾病或疾病分类,还有人们的眼界及看问题的角度都有巨变。谁对此变化负有主要责任?谁是此变化的创造者?回答说是比沙或是第一批支持临床解剖学的人,则有些牵强附会。这是医学认识在实践与规则里发生的复杂而共同的转化,这个转化不是消极现象。消除了消极性,铲除了障碍,纠正了偏见,抛弃了空想,无理性信仰的退却,最后总算自由地进入了理性和体验。这表现出了栅栏作用。一个全新的、有筛选功能的栅栏;一个有自己的规则、决定和界限的,有自己内部逻辑、参数和死路的,总之这是一个与最初相比具有引向变革特点的新工具。理解便蕴涵在这种功能里。如果研究一下认识史,便会看到两种分析方向。依照第一种方向,应该表示出理解在已形成的规则里如何,在何种条件下,及源于何种原因进行着改变,并未经过发现“真理”的原始“发明者”;依照第二种方向,应该显示出理解原则如何能够在个体身上产生出新的、前所未有的认识。此时,我的工作与乔姆斯基先生的计划衔接上了。我的工作方法欠完善,方式也差。依赖某些明确的因素,一些从未出现过的、不被人们所知的总体性才能被人们揭示开来。为了解决这个问题,乔姆斯基先生应把主体的窘境再引进语法分析领域内。在我的历史范围内,为了解决一个类似的问题,却要使用相反的方法:把理解观点,它的规则,它的体系,它的总体性的转化引进个体认识的运作规则里。不管是哪种方法,创造性这个问题不能用同一种方法解决,或者说,不能用相同的词语表达出来,因为它所属的学科不尽相同。

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