乔姆斯基与福柯之辩:人性、公正、权力(二)

CHOMSKY: I think in part we're slightly talking at cross-purposes, because of a different use of the term creativity. In fact, I should say that my use of the term creativity is a little bit idiosyncratic and therefore the onus falls on me in this case, not on you. But when I speak of creativity, I'm not attributing to the concept the notion of value that is normal when we speak of creativity. That is, when you speak of scientific creativity, you're speaking, properly, of the achievements of a Newton. But in the context in which I have been speaking about creativity, it's a normal human act.

乔姆斯基:我想,由于对创造性这个词的用法不同,我们俩人有些分歧。实际上,我使用此词的方式略有其特殊性,这个责任全在于我。当我谈及这个词时,我没有赋予这个概念通常所具有的价值观念。当谈到科学创造性,人们便联想到比如牛顿的创造。但在我援引此字的背景里,是人类的一般活动。

I'm speaking of the kind of creativity that any child demonstrates when he's able to come to grips with a new situation: to describe it properly, react to it properly, tell one something about it, think about it in a new fashion for him and so on. I think it's appropriate to call those acts creative, but of course without thinking of those acts as being the acts of a Newton.

我所说的创造性是任何一个儿童在新的环境里所表现出来的斗争:他学习恰到好处地描写这个环境,恰如其分地对它产生反应,谈论它,用一种对孩子来说是新鲜的方式来思索它。我想可以把这种行为看作是创造性,但未必是属于牛顿式的创造行为。

In fact it may very well be true that creativity in the arts or the sciences, that which goes beyond the normal, may really involve properties of, well, I would also say of human nature, which may not exist fully developed in the mass of mankind, and may not constitute part of the normal creativity of everyday life.

也许在艺术和科学领域里的创造性需要某些特性,这种特性不属于人类大众,也不是日常生活中的一般创造性。

Now my belief is that science can look forward to the problem of normal creativity as a topic that it can perhaps incorporate within itself. But I don't believe, and I suspect you will agree, that science can look forward, at least in the reasonable future, to coming to grips with true creativity, the achievements of the great artist and the great scientist. It has no hope of accommodating these unique phenomena within its grasp. It's the lower levels of creativity that I've been speaking of.

我确信科学可以纳入一般创造性的主题。但我并不认为(漏翻了and I suspect you will agree)在短时期内它便可以同真正的创造性、同一个伟大的艺术家或一个大学者的事业相抗衡,它毫无将这些非凡奇才据为己有的希望,我所说的是创造性的最低档次。

Now, as far as what you say about the history of science is concerned, I think that's correct and illuminating and particularly relevant in fact to the kinds of enterprise that I see lying before us in psychology and linguistics and the philosophy of the mind.

您关于科学史的观点我认为非常正确、清晰,并完全符合我们在心理学、语言学和精神哲学领域里要做的工作。

That is, I think there are certain topics that have been repressed or put aside during the scientific advances of the past few centuries.

我认为在最近几个世纪,随着科学的进步,某些词汇被取消或排挤出去了。

For example, this concern with low-level creativity that I'm referring to was really present in Descartes also. For example, when he speaks of the difference between a parrot, who can mimic what is said, and a human, who can say new things that are appropriate to the situation, and when he specifies that as being the distinctive property that designates the limits of physics and carries us into the science of the mind, to use modern terms, I think he really is referring to the kind of creativity that I have in mind; and I quite agree with your comments about the other sources of such notions.

如我使用的低层次的创造性在笛卡尔那里就出现过。当笛卡尔谈及鹦鹉与人的区别时,他认为鹦鹉具有复制语言的能力,而人则可以说出适应情景的新东西。他明确提出这个显著特性,指出了物理的限度,并把我们引入精神科学。为了使用现代词汇,我记得他使用了类似于创造性这样的词。我同意您关于这些观念的其他出处的意见。

Well, these concepts, even in fact the whole notion of the organisation of sentence structure, were put aside during the period of great advances that followed from Sir William Jones and others and the development of comparative philology as a whole.

这些概念——事实上,句子结构组织的所有观念——在随威廉·琼斯及其他人而来的巨大进步时期和比较语文学发展中都被排除了。

But now, I think, we can go beyond that period when it was necessary to forget and to pretend that these phenomena did not exist and to turn to something else. In this period of comparative philology and also, in my view, structural linguistics, and much of behavioural psychology, and in fact much of what grows out of the empiricist tradition in the study of mind and behaviour, it is possible to put aside those limitations and bring into our consideration just those topics that animated a good deal of the thinking and speculation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to incorporate them within a much broader and I think deeper science of man that will give a fuller role-though it is certainly not expected to give a complete understanding to such notions as innovation and creativity and freedom and the production of new entities, new elements of thought and behaviour within some system of rule and schematism. Those are concepts that I think we can come to grips with.

但是目前,我想我们应该是度过了必须遗忘、必须声称这些现象并不存在以便转向其他事物的时代。在这个比较语文学时代——我认为同时也是结构语言学时代、行为主义心理学时代及所有那些源于精神和行为研究的知识传统时代——有可能排除这些界限,重视那些给予17、18世纪大部分思想和思辨以活力的词汇,并可能把它们融入一个更广泛、更深入的人的科学里。这门科学将把更广泛的角色给予众多观念,诸如革新、创造性、自由、新实体的产生,思想新要素的产生及其规则体系和模式里的行为产生等等,这是一些我们可以掌握的概念。

ELDERS: Well, may I first of all ask you not to make your answers so lengthy? [Foucault laughs.]

埃勒德:首先我能否请您不要回答得这么长?

When you discuss creativity and freedom, I think that one of the misunderstandings, if any misunderstandings have arisen, has to do with the fact that Mr. Chomsky is starting from a limited number of rules with infinite possibilities of application, whereas you, Mr. Foucault, are stressing the inevitability of the "grille" of our historical and psychological determinisms, which also applies to the way in which we discover new ideas.

当你们谈论创造性和自由时,我想有一个误会,如果有的话。这个误会来源自乔姆斯基先生从有限的规则同操作的无限可能性出发;而您,福柯先生,您强调心理及历史决定论的“栅栏”的不可避免性,它也作用于我们发现新思想的方法。

Perhaps we can sort this out, not by analysing the scientific process, but just by analysing our own thought process.

也许,不分析科学程序而分析我们自己的思想程序,可以解决这个问题。

When you discover a new fundamental idea, Mr. Foucault, do you believe, that as far as your own personal creativity is concerned something is happening that makes you feel that you are being liberated; that something new has been developed? Perhaps afterwards you discover that it was not so new. But do you yourself believe that, within your own personality, creativity and freedom are working together, or not?

当您发现了一个重要的新思想,福柯先生,这涉及到您个人的创造性,您认为这件事是自由的象征,是某个新事物的诞生吗?您可能随后发现这是个错误吗?您认为在您的品格里,创造性和自由同时在起作用吗?

FOUCAULT: Oh, you know, I don't believe that the problem of personal experience is so very important...

福柯:噢,要知道,我不认为个人经验问题很重要……

ELDERS: Why not?

埃勒德:为什么?

FOUCAULT: ...in a question like this. No, I believe that there is in reality quite a strong similarity between what Mr. Chomsky said and what I tried to show: in other words there exist in fact only possible creations, possible innovations. One can only, in terms of language or of knowledge, produce something new by putting into play a certain number of rules which will define the acceptability or the grammaticality of these statements, or which will define, in the case of knowledge, the scientific character of the statements.

福柯:……在这个问题上。不,事实上我认为在乔姆斯基先生所讲的及我试图表明的之间存在着极为相似的东西。换句话说,事实上只有可能的创造,可能的革新。在语言及认识领域只有让一些规则发挥作用才能产生一些新东西。这些规则会确定叙述的可接受性或是否符合语法规则。在认识范围内,这些规则或许会确定叙述的科学性。

Thus, we can roughly say that linguists before Mr. Chomsky mainly insisted on the rules of construction of statements and less on the innovation represented by every new statement, or the hearing of a new statement. And in the history of science or in the history of thought, we placed more emphasis on individual creation, and we had kept aside and left in the shadows these communal, general rules, which obscurely manifest themselves through every scientific discovery, every scientific invention, and even every philosophical innovation.

因此,在乔姆斯基先生之前的语言学家特别重视叙述结构的规则而并不强调新叙述中所表现出的革新或对它的接受。在科学史或思想史中,人们习惯于重视个人的创造而把一般的规则类型撇在一边。而恰是后者在整个科学发现、整个科学发明中默默地起作用,甚至也贯穿于整个哲学革新中。

And to that degree, when I no doubt wrongly believe that I am saying something new, I am nevertheless conscious of the fact that in my statement there are rules at work, not only linguistic rules, but also epistemological rules, and those rules characterise contemporary knowledge.

在这方面,当我错误地以为我说出了什么新东西时,我意识到事实上在我的叙述中有规则在起作用,并不仅仅是语言学规则,还有知识规则,它们构成了现代认识的特点。

CHOMSKY: Well, perhaps I can try to react to those comments within my own framework in a way which will maybe shed some light on this.

乔姆斯基:我试着用更清晰的方法谈谈这些论点。

Let's think again of a human child, who has in his mind some schematism that determines the kind of language he can learn. Okay. And then, given experience, he very quickly knows the language, of which this experience is a part, or in which it is included.

回过头来再看看孩子们的例子。儿童具有了一些模式,它可以确定儿童所能学会的语言方式。那好,以他的经验,儿童很快地学会了作为此经验一部分的语言,或者说是包含在此经验里的语言。

Now this is a normal act; that is, it's an act of normal intelligence, but it's a highly creative act.

这是正常的行为,是标准的智力行为,是具有相当创造性的行为。

If a Martian were to look at this process of acquiring this vast and complicated and intricate system of knowledge on the basis of this ridiculously small quantity of data, he would think of it as an immense act of invention and creation. In fact, a Martian would, I think, consider it as much of an achievement as the invention of, let's say, any aspect of a physical theory on the basis of the data that was presented to the physicist.

如果一个火星人注意到了建立在极为有限的材料基础上的庞大复杂的知识获取程序,他会认为这是一个巨大发明,是创造性行为。事实上我想,火星人会认为这是一个成功,可以同物理学家在自己掌握的材料基础上发明了物理理论相媲美。

However, if this hypothetical Martian were then to observe that every normal human child immediately carries out this creative act and they all do it in the same way and without any difficulty, whereas it takes centuries of genius to slowly carry out the creative act of going from evidence to a scientific theory, then this Martian would, if he were rational, conclude that the structure of the knowledge that is acquired in the case of language is basically internal to the human mind; whereas the structure of physics is not, in so direct a way, internal to the human mind. Our minds are not constructed so that when we look at the phenomena of the world theoretical physics comes forth, and we write it down and produce it; that's not the way our minds are constructed.

然而,如果这个火星人发现所有正常儿童都能很快完成这个创造性行为,没有丝毫困难,方法也都相似,而摸索出它的科学理论却需要几代奇才的共同努力(注:这里的“科学理论”应为泛指,并非特指“它的科学理论”),火星人自然会得出在语言方面获取知识的结构位于人类精神的里面的结论。而物理结构不是这样直接的。人们观察世上的一种现象,物理理论便会从中涌现出来,我们只要把它记录下来、生产出来就可以了。精神不是这样的,我们的精神不是这样构成的。

Nevertheless, I think there is a possible point of connection and it might be useful to elaborate it: that is, how is it that we are able to construct any kind of scientific theory at all? How is it that, given a small amount of data, it's possible for various scientists, for various geniuses even, over a long period of time, to arrive at some kind of a theory, at least in some cases, that is more or less profound and more or less empirically adequate?

但我认为存在一个交点,应该也对它进行研究:我们怎样做才能制定出一个科学理论来?尤其当看到一些学者及一些天才所掌握的材料是那样的少,即使用了相当长的时间,但最后却得到了一个或多或少比较深刻的理论,而此理论能与实践相吻合。

This is a remarkable fact.

这是令人赞叹的。

And, in fact, if it were not the case that these scientists, including the geniuses, were beginning with a very narrow limitation on the class of possible scientific theories, if they didn't have built into their minds somehow an obviously unconscious specification of what is a possible scientific theory, then this inductive leap would certainly be quite impossible: just as if each child did not have built into his mind the concept of human language in a very restricted way, then the inductive leap from data to knowledge of a language would be impossible.

事实上,如果这些科学家,包括那些天才不是在极为有限的条件下开始他们的可能存在的科学理论研究的话,就没有可能实现归纳性的跳跃。同样,一个儿童如果没有极为有制约的人类语言概念的话,就永远不会出现从素材到语言知识的归纳性跳跃。

So even though the process of, let's say, deriving knowledge of physics from data is far more complex, far more difficult for an organism such as ours, far more drawn out in time, requiring intervention of genius and so on and so forth, nevertheless in a certain sense the achievement of discovering physical science or biology or whatever you like, is based on something rather similar to the achievement of the normal child in discovering the structure of his language: that is, it must be achieved on the basis of an initial limitation, an initial restriction on the class of possible theories. If you didn't begin by knowing that only certain things are possible theories, then no induction would be possible at all. You could go from data anywhere, in any direction. And the fact that science converges and progresses itself shows us that such initial limitations and structures exist.

当然,依据材料进行知识分流(注:derive和“分流”无关吧)的程序在物理领域里要复杂得多,对于像我们人体一样的组织来说也更为困难,需要相当长的时间,必需天才的介入。从某种意义上说,物理学或生物科学或其他学科的成功都建立在某种程序之上,这种程序类似正常儿童发现语言结构的程序。这个程序应该在最初的限制基础上,在可能存在的理论分类的制约基础上得以完成。如果最初人们就不知道只有某些材料可以通向理论,那么任何归纳法都无从谈起,材料可以把你引向任何方向。科学自行汇合和进步的事实说明起初的限制和这些结构都是存在的。

If we really want to develop a theory of scientific creation, or for that matter artistic creation, I think we have to focus attention precisely on that set of conditions that, on the one hand, delimits and restricts the scope of our possible knowledge, while at the same time permitting the inductive leap to complicated systems of knowledge on the basis of a small amount of data. That, it seems to me, would be the way to progress towards a theory of scientific creativity, or in fact towards any question of epistemology.

如果我们确实想发展科学创造的理论,或者在这种情况下发展艺术创造理论,我想我们应准确地把注意力集中在总体条件上。一方面这些条件限制和制约了我们可能获得的知识面,而另一方面,它们又使我们得以实现通向知识复杂体系的归纳性跳跃。我认为这条道路可以通向科学创造性的理论,或者找到解决认识问题的办法。

ELDERS: Well, I think if we take this point of the initial limitation with all its creative possibilities, I have the impression that for Mr. Chomsky rules and freedom are not opposed to each other, but more or less imply each other. Whereas I get the impression that it is just the reverse for you, Mr. Foucault. What are your reasons for putting it the opposite way, for this really is a very fundamental point in the debate, and I hope we can elaborate it.

埃勒德:那好。假如我们接受这个最初限制及它的所有创造可能性的说法。我的印象是在乔姆斯基先生那里规则和自由是不相抵触,它们相互包含;而在福柯先生那里却正好相反。您这样认为的理由是什么?这是今天这场辩论会的重点,希望我们能深入地谈一谈。

To formulate the same problem in other terms: can you think of universal knowledge without any form of repression?

为了换个角度,您能否使用大众知识形式,没有任何抑制地谈一下这个问题?

FOUCAULT: Well, in what Mr. Chomsky has just said there is something which seems to me to create a little difficulty; perhaps I understood it badly.

福柯:好吧,可能我未很好地理解乔姆斯基先生所讲的话,但我觉得有一个小难点。

I believe that you have been talking about a limited number of possibilities in the order of a scientific theory. That is true if you limit yourself to a fairly short period of time, whatever it may be. But if you consider a longer period, it seems to me that what is striking is the proliferation of possibilities by divergences.

我认为您谈了在科学理论方面的一些可能性的限制。如果您局限在一个比较短的时期蚋,情况的确是这样的。但如果您涉及到一个长的时期,令人惊奇的是辐散状的可能性的膨胀。

For a long time the idea has existed that the sciences, knowledge, followed a certain line of "progress", obeying the principle of "growth", and the principle of the convergence of all these kinds of knowledge. And yet when one sees how the European understanding, which turned out to be a world-wide and universal understanding in a historical and geographical sense, developed, can one say that there has been growth? I, myself, would say that it has been much more a matter of transformation.

长期以来,人们曾认为科学、知识是循着某条“进步”的路线,服从于“增长”的原则和汇聚各种各样知识的原则。但是当看到欧洲的理解方式是如何发展的,在历史和地域方面它最后成为世界的和普遍的理解方式,我们还能说这是增长吗?我看还不如说是转变。

Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications. How often have they not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules: by symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of evolution. Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. You have there a principle of divergence, much more than one of growth. I would much rather say that there are many different ways of making possible simultaneously a few types of knowledge. There is, therefore, from a certain point of view, always an excess of data in relation to possible systems in a given period, which causes them to be experienced within their boundaries, even in their deficiency, which means that one fails to realise their creativity; and from another point of view, that of the historian, there is an excess, a proliferation of systems for a small amount of data, from which originates the widespread idea that it is the discovery of new facts which determines movement in the history of science.

咱们以动物和植物的分类为例。从中世纪以来,根据截然不同的规则,人们已经重写多少遍了?有从符号学角度分类的,有从自然史、从人体比较解剖学、从进化论等各种角度分类的。而每一次重写都使知识在它的功能、结构、内部关系方面发生全新的变化。这里有一个辐散原则,它远远超过增长原则。我更倾向于认为有众多方式都可以使少量知识同时得以实现。因此,从某种观点看,在一特定时期内总是有与可能系统相关的材料过剩情况,它促使在局限的贫乏的条件下进行实验,但却阻碍了创造性。从另一观点看,即从史学家的观点看,总是系统过多过滥而材料相应不足。因而普遍产生了这样的想法:科学史的进程取决于新现象的发现。

CHOMSKY: Here perhaps again, let me try to synthesise a bit. I agree with your conception of scientific progress; that is, I don't think that scientific progress is simply a matter of the accumulated addition of new knowledge and the absorption of new theories and so on. Rather I think that it has this sort of jagged pattern that you describe, forgetting certain problems and leaping to new theories. .

乔姆斯基:我概括一下我的想法。我同意您关于科学进步的观念。就是说我不认为这是个新知识积累的问题、而是汲取新理论的问题,等等。(这里是并列关系不是转折关系,用“而是”不妥)更确切地说,我认为它是走着一条您描绘的弯弯曲曲的路,同时置某些问题于脑后以便赶紧占有新的理论。

FOUCAULT: And transforming the same knowledge.

福柯:和转变相同的知识。

CHOMSKY: Right. But I think that one can perhaps hazard an explanation for that. Oversimplifying grossly, I really don't mean what I'm going to say now literally, one might suppose that the following general lines of an explanation are accurate: it is as if, as human beings of a particular biologically given organisation, we have in our heads, to start with, a certain set of possible intellectual structures, possible sciences. Okay?

我想还可以深入地解释一下。简言之,我下面要说的大体上假设为正确的:作为一个特定的生物学构造的人类,一开始在我们头脑里就有某种可能存在的智力结构的规则、某个可能存在的科学的规则。

Now, in the lucky event that some aspect of reality happens to have the character of one of these structures in our mind, then we have a science: that is to say that, fortunately, the structure of our mind and the structure of some aspect of reality coincide sufficiently so that we develop an intelligible science.

如果有幸,现实中的一个现象有我们头脑里的某个结构的特点,我们便拥有了一门学科。也就是说,极为幸运,我们头脑的结构和现实现象的结构恰到好处地吻合了,我们就发展了一门显而易懂的学科。

It is precisely this initial limitation in our minds to a certain kind of possible science which provides the tremendous richness and creativity of scientific knowledge. It is important to stress-and this has to do with your point about limitation and freedom-that were it not for these limitations, we would not have the creative act of going from a little bit of knowledge, a little bit of experience, to a rich and highly articulated and complicated array of knowledge. Because if anything could be possible, then nothing would be possible.

就是我们头脑中的这种对某些学科的原始限制提供了科学知识的巨大财富和创造性。有必要强调一下,如果没有这些限制我们就不可能有创造行为。这是从微不足道的知识、不足挂齿的经验中把我们引导到极为复杂、清晰的知识和创造行为。现在我又回到限制与自由的关系问题上了。因为如果一切都是可能的,那就没有什么是可能的了。

But it is precisely because of this property of our minds, which in detail we don't understand, but which, I think, in a general way we can begin to perceive, which presents us with certain possible intelligible structures, and which in the course of history and insight and experience begin to come into focus or fall out of focus and so on; it is precisely because of this property of our minds that the progress of science, I think, has this erratic and jagged character that you describe.

恰恰由于我们头脑里的这种特性,我们得以发现某些有可能理解的结构。我们对头脑的这种特性还未有细致的了解,但已开始发现它了。这种特性在历史的长河中、在研究的进展中、在经验的积累中时隐时现……也正是由于这种特性,科学的进步具有您描绘的混沌、碰撞之特点。

That doesn't mean that everything is ultimately going to fall within the domain of science. Personally I believe that many of the things we would like to understand, and maybe the things we would most like to understand, such as the nature of man, or the nature of a decent society, or lots of other things, might really fall outside the scope of possible human science.

这并不意味着最终一切都被包括进科学领域之中。我个人认为许多我们不惜任何代价企盼能够理解的东西,比如人性、情理社会的性质及许多其他问题,事实上都是人文科学力所不能及的。

ELDERS: Well, I think that we are confronted again with the question of the inner relation between limitation and freedom. Do you agree, Mr. Foucault, with the statement about the combination of limitation, fundamental limitation? .

埃勒德:我想我们又一次面对限制与自由之间的原始关系问题。福柯先生,您是否肯定同意限制的组合、基本的限制……

FOUCAULT: It is not a matter of combination. Only creativity is possible in putting into play of a system of rules; it is not a mixture of order and freedom.

福柯:这不是组合问题。只有从规则体系出发才谈得上可能的创造性,这不是自由与规则的掺和。

Where perhaps I don't completely agree with Mr. Chomsky, is when he places the principle of these regularities, in a way, in the interior of the mind or of human nature.

可能我与乔姆斯基先生意见不完全一致的地方是他把规则性的原则置于可以说是精神或人性的内部。

If it is a matter of whether these rules are effectively put to work by the human mind, all right; all right, too, if it is a question of whether the historian and the linguist can think it in their turn; it is all right also to say that these rules should allow us to realise what is said or thought by these individuals. But to say that these regularities are connected, as conditions of existence, to the human mind or its nature, is difficult for me to accept: it seems to me that one must, before reaching that point-and in any case I am talking only about the understanding-replace it in the field of other human practices, such as economics, technology, politics, sociology, which can serve them as conditions of formation, of models, of place, of apparition, etc. I would like to know whether one cannot discover the system of regularity, of constraint, which makes science possible, somewhere else, even outside the human mind, in social forms, in the relations of production, in the class struggles, etc.

如果问题在于这些规则是否的确通过人的精神在发挥作用,很好;史学家和语言学家是否能来思考一下这个问题,很好,那么这些规则就应该使我们能够掌握这些个体的言论和思想。但我们难以接受这些规则与人的精神或人的性质有关联的说法。如同生存条件一样:我觉得在触及这点之前,应把这些规则置于人类实践的其他领域中去,如经济、技术、政治以及社会的实践中去。这些领域能为这些规则提供形成条件、显露条件及范例。我设想使科学成为可能的这个规则体系、制约体系似乎也存在于其他地方,甚至在人类精神之外,存在于社会形式中、生产关系中、阶级斗争里等等。

For example, the fact that at a certain time madness became an object for scientific study, and an object of knowledge in the West, seems to me to be linked to a particular economic and social situation.

比如在某些时期,疯狂成为欧洲科学研究和学问的主题,这个事实使我觉得它同经济形势、独特的社会形势有关联。

Perhaps the point of difference between Mr. Chomsky and myself is that when he speaks of science he probably thinks of the formal organisation of knowledge, whereas I am speaking of knowledge itself, that is to say, I think of the content of various knowledges which is dispersed into a particular society, permeates through that society, and asserts itself as the foundation for education, for theories, for practices, etc.

可能乔姆斯基先生与我之间的分歧在于当他谈及科学时,他大概想到的是知识的形式组织,而我谈的是知识本身,也就是说各种分散在特定社会里的知识内容,它在这个社会里无处不在,构成教育、理论、实践等的基础。

ELDERS: But what does this theory of knowledge mean for your theme of the death of man or the end of the period of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries?

埃勒德:这种知识理论同您的19-20世纪末的人类死亡主题相比意味着什么?

FOUCAULT: But this doesn't have any relation to what we are talking about.

福柯:这同咱们今天谈论的事情毫无关系。

ELDERS: I don't know, because I was trying to apply what you have said to your anthropological notion. You have already refused to speak about your own creativity and freedom, haven't you? Well, I'm wondering what are the psychological reasons for this.

埃勒德:我不知道。我只是想把您说过的话运用到您的人类学概念中去。您已经拒绝谈论您自己的创造性和您的自由,不是吗?我想是什么心理因素……

FOUCAULT: [Protesting.] Well, you can wonder about it, but I can't help that.

福柯:好吧,您可以去想,但我帮不了忙。

ELDERS: Ah, well.

埃勒德:噢,是吗。

FOUCAULT: I am not wondering about it.

福柯:这不关我的事。

ELDERS: But what are the objective reasons, in relation to your conception of understanding, of knowledge, of science, for refusing to answer these personal questions?

埃勒德:但您拒绝回答有关您个人问题的客观理由是什么呢?这同您的理解概念、知识概念、科学概念有关。

When there is a problem for you to answer, what are your reasons for making a problem out of a personal question?

在您解决问题时,为什么要把个个的事转变成问题呢?

FOUCAULT: No, I'm not making a problem out of a personal question; I make of a personal question an absence of a problem.

不,我并未把个人的事当作一个问题,对我来说个人的事不是问题。

Let me take a very simple example, which I will not analyse, but which is this: How was it possible that men began, at the end of the eighteenth century, for the first time in the history of Western thought and of Western knowledge, to open up the corpses of people in order to know what was the source, the origin, the anatomical needle, of the particular malady which was responsible for their deaths?

我举一个非常简单的例子,不加任何分析。在18世纪末期,人类如何能够剖开尸体以便找出致死的根源呢?这在西方的思想认识史中是前所未有的。

The idea seems simple enough. Well, four or five thousand years of medicine in the West were needed before we had the idea of looking for the cause of the malady in the lesion of a corpse.

原因似乎很简单。但这是西方医学界用了四千年或五千年的时间才产生出从病损尸体中寻找病因的想法。

If you tried to explain this by the personality of Bichat, I believe that would be without interest. If, on the contrary, you tried to establish the place of disease and of death in society at the end of the eighteenth century, and what interest industrial society effectively had in quadrupling the entire population in order to expand and develop itself, as a result of which medical surveys of society were made, big hospitals were opened, etc.; if you tried to find out how medical knowledge became institutionalised in that period, how its relations with other kinds of knowledge were ordered, well, then you could see how the relationship between disease, the hospitalised, ill person, the corpse, and pathological anatomy were made possible.

要从比沙的个性中寻找答案我想是没有意义的。相反,如果你给18世纪末社会的疾病和死亡问题一席之地,注意到这个工业社会的人中增加了4倍,而这是对社会展开了健康调查并开设了大医院的结果;如果再努力搞清楚医学知识在此期间是如何巩固下来的,它同其他形式的知识是如何结合在一起的,就会掌握疾病、病人、医院里的病员、尸体和病理解剖学之间的关系了。

Here is, I believe, a form of analysis which I don't say is new, but which in any case has been much too neglected; and personal events have almost nothing to do with it.

我认为这就是一种分析形式。我并不认为它是新方法,但却被人极为忽视。个人的事情在这方面一般不起任何作用。

ELDERS: Yes, but nevertheless it would have been very interesting for us to know a little bit more about your arguments to refute this.

埃勒德:好的,但我们还是希望能更充分地了解您的理由。

Could you, Mr. Chomsky-and as far as I'm concerned, it's my last question about this philosophical part of the debate-give your ideas about, for example, the way the social sciences are working? I'm thinking here especially about your severe attacks on behaviourism. And perhaps you could even explain a little the way Mr. Foucault is now working in a more or less behaviouristic way. [Both philosophers laugh.]

乔姆斯基先生,您是否能和我们谈谈社会科学运作的方式?这是这场讨论会哲学部分的最后一个问题。这尤其使我想到您给予行为主义的严厉抨击。或许您还可以解释一下福柯先生目前使用的或多或少的行为主义方式。

CHOMSKY: I would like to depart from your injunction very briefly, just to make one comment about what Mr. Foucault just said.

在满足您的要求之前,我希望简单地概述一下福柯先生刚才的一席话。

I think that illustrates very nicely the way in which we're digging into the mountain from opposite directions, to use your original image. That is, I think that an act of scientific creation depends on two facts: one, some intrinsic property of the mind, another, some set of social and intellectual conditions that exist. And it is not a question, as I see it, of which of these we should study; rather we will understand scientific discovery, and similarly any other kind of discovery, when we know what these factors are and can therefore explain how they interact in a particular fashion.

我想这番话恰到好处地说明了您对我们的写照:我们俩人分头在一座大山下挖隧道。我认为科学创造行为依附于两点:首先是精神内在的特性,其次是社会条件和智力条件的特定总体。问题不在于搞清我们应研究其中的哪一个。当我们了解并能够解释这些因素相互起作用的方式后,我们便理解了科学发明及其他发现。

My particular interest, in this connection at least, is with the intrinsic capacities of the mind; yours, as you say, is in the particular arrangement of social and economic and other conditions.

我尤其对精神的内在能力感兴趣,而您尤为关注的是社会、经济和其他方面条件的组织。

FOUCAULT: But I don't believe that difference is connected to our characters-because at this moment it would make Mr. Elders right, and he must not be right.

福柯:但我不认为分歧同我们的性格有关。如若有关的话,埃勒德就得理了,而他不应有理。

CHOMSKY: No, I agree, and...

乔姆斯基:对,我同意,但……

FOUCAULT: It's connected to the state of knowledge, of knowing, in which we are working. The linguistics with which you have been familiar, and which you have succeeded in transforming, excluded the importance of the creative subject, of the creative speaking subject; while the history of science such as it existed when people of my generation were starting to work, on the contrary, exalted individual creativity. .

福柯:这同知识状态有关,同我们在工作中的认识有关。您对语言学驾轻就熟,并已成功地将它进行了改造,排除了创造性主体,即创造性言语主体的重要性。但科学史就不同了,当我们这辈人着手开始研究它时,它已对个体的创造性大为赞扬……

CHOMSKY: Yes.

乔姆斯基:是的。

FOUCAULT: ...and put aside these collective rules.

福柯:……并避开共同规则。

CHOMSKY: Yes, yes.

QUESTION: Ah...

ELDERS:

  Yes, please go on.

QUESTION: It goes a bit back in your discussion, but what I should like to know, Mr. Chomsky, is this: you suppose a basic system of what must be in a way elementary limitations that are present in what you call human nature; to what extent do you think these are subject to historical change? Do you think, for instance, that they have changed substantially since, let's say, the seventeenth century? In that case, you could perhaps connect this with the ideas of Mr. Foucault?

一名与会者:我想往前追溯一下你们的讨论。乔姆斯基先生,我想知道的是您从根本上设想了一个基本限制体系,它体现在您称之为人性的概念里面。您认为它在何种程度上受制于历史的变迁呢?举例说,您认为自从17世纪它们就被大量地进行改造了吗?在此情况下,您能否把这种观点同福柯先生的观点相联系呢?

CHOMSKY: Well, I think that as a matter of biological and anthropological fact, the nature of human intelligence certainly has not changed in any substantial way, at least since the seventeenth century, or probably since Cro-Magnon man. That is, I think that the fundamental properties of our intelligence, those that are within the domain of what we are discussing tonight, are certainly very ancient; and that if you took a man from five thousand or maybe twenty thousand years ago, and placed him as a child within today's society, he would learn what everyone else learns, and he would be a genius or a fool or something else, but he wouldn't be fundamentally different.

乔姆斯基:好吧,我想这是个生物学和人类学方面的问题。从17世纪以来,人的智力特点肯定没有多大变化,可能从克罗马农人算起也没有多大变化。我想我们智力的主要特性,这是今晚讨论会中经常提及的,肯定是相当古老的。如果一个五千年前或两万年前的人转世到当今社会的一个孩子身上,他能够像其他所有人一样学会各种东西。也许他会是一个奇才,也可能是个笨蛋,但肯定不会有本质差异。

But, of course, the level of acquired knowledge changes, social conditions change-those conditions that permit a person to think freely and break through the bonds of, let's say, superstitious constraint. And as those conditions change, a given human intelligence will progress to new forms of creation. In fact this relates very closely to the last question that Mr. Elders put, if I can perhaps say a word about that.

当然获取知识的水平发生了变化,社会条件也变化了。这使当代人可以自由地思考、斩断同迷信压近的关系。随着这些条件的变化,一定的人类智力朝着新的创造方式进步。这也是对埃勒德先生最后一个问题的回答。对此我想再说一点。

Take behavioural science, and think of it in these contexts. It seems to me that the fundamental property of behaviourism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term behavioural science, is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory. That is, what defines behaviourism is the very curious and self-destructive assumption that you are not permitted to create an interesting theory.

让我们把行为主义科学放在这一背景中看看。行为科学这个怪词使我联想起行为主义的主要特性,我感觉这个特性对发展科学理论的可能性起着负作用。好奇的和自毁的假设为行为主义下了定义,据此假设,我们不可能创立一个有意义的理论。

If physics, for example, had made the assumption that you have to keep to phenomena and their arrangement and such things, we would be doing Babylonian astronomy today. Fortunately physicists never made this ridiculous, extraneous assumption, which has its own historical reasons and had to do with all sorts of curious facts about the historical context in which behaviourism evolved.

举例说,如果物理学提出的假设是以现象及其表现为本,那么我们今天仍在研究巴比伦的天文。幸好物理学家们从未提出这种荒谬可笑的假设。但这种假设有其历史缘由并涉及在历史背景中的所有各种奇异事物,行为主义便是在此背景下得以发展的。

But looking at it purely intellectually, behaviourism is the arbitrary insistence that one must not create a scientific theory of human behaviour; rather one must deal directly with phenomena and their interrelation, and no more something which is totally impossible in any other domain, and I assume impossible in the domain of human intelligence or human behaviour as well. So in this sense I don't think that behaviourism is a science. Here is a case in point of just the kind of thing that you mentioned and that Mr. Foucault is discussing: under certain historical circumstances, for example those in which experimental psychology developed, it was-for some reason which I won't go into-interesting and maybe important to impose some very strange limitations on the kind of scientific theory construction that was permitted, and those very strange limitations are known as behaviourism. Well, it has long since run its course, I think. Whatever value it may have had in 1880, it has no function today except constraining and limiting scientific inquiry and should therefore simply be dispensed with, in the same way one would dispense with a physicist who said: you're not allowed to develop a general physical theory, you're only allowed to plot the motions of the planets and make up more epicycles and so on and so forth. One forgets about that and puts it aside. Similarly one should put aside the very curious restrictions that define behaviourism; restrictions which are, as I said before, very much suggested by the term behavioural science itself.

如果从纯精神角度看这个问题,行为主义可概括为武断地禁止建立一个人类行为的科学理论。此外它还开始直接研究现象及现象之间的关系,仅此而已。这在其他领域里是绝对不可能的事情,在智力或人类行为领域也绝对行不通。在此意义上说,我不认为行为主义是一种科学。我现在回答您的问题,回到福柯先生谈到的问题上来。在历史的某些环境中,比如说实验心理学发展的环境中,把奇怪的限制强加于可信的科学理论的建设中是令人感兴趣的,也是非常重要的,这种限制被称为行为主义。出于某种考虑,在此我不详加解释了。这种想法曾盛行一时。在1880年,这种想法可能具有某些价值,但是现在,它唯一的作用就是限制和扼杀科学调查,因此应该干脆摆脱它。正如一位物理学家所说:“你们无权提出一个普通物理学的理论,而只有研究天体运动和发现新本轮的权利。”人们忘记了这些。必须摆脱确定行为主义的奇怪限制,这些限制本身由行为科学的词汇表达出来的。

We can agree, perhaps, that behaviour in some broad sense constitutes the data for the science of man. But to define a science by its data would be to define physics as the theory of meter-readings. And if a physicist were to say: yes, I'm involved in meter-reading science, we could be pretty sure that he was not going to get very far. They might talk about meter-readings and correlations between them and such things, but they wouldn't ever create physical theory.

从广义上看,行为构成了人文科学的素材,我们同意这点。但通过这些素材来确定一门科学便又回到把物理学确定为阅读测量仪器的理论上了。如果有一位物理学家声称:“我致力于阅读测量方面的理论。”肯定他不会走出多远。他可以谈论测量,谈论测量之间的关系,但却永远创立不出一个物理学理论。

And so the term itself is symptomatic of the disease in this case. We should understand the historical context in which these curious limitations developed, and having understood them, I believe, discard them and proceed in the science of man as we would in any other domain, that is by discarding entirely behaviourism and in fact, in my view, the entire empiricist tradition from which it evolved.

在这种情况下,词语仅是征候性的。我们应该了解这些奇怪限制发展的历史背景,然后就像在其他领域里一样抛开它,在人类科学方面继续前进,同时彻底淘汰行为主义。依我看,还有其他所有源自行为主义的经验论传统。

QUESTION: So you are not willing to link your theory about innate limitations, with Mr. Foucault's theory of the "grille". There might be a certain connection. You see, Mr. Foucault says that an upsurge of creativity in a certain direction automatically removes knowledge in another direction, by a system of "grilles". Well, if you had a changing system of limitations, this might be connected.

一与会者:您并不期望把您的天赋限制理论同福柯先生的“栅栏”理论相沟通,可能在这两者之间存在着某种关系。比如说福柯先生认为在某些方面的剩余创造性通过“栅栏”理论相沟通,可能在这两者之间存在着某种关系。比如说福柯先生认为在某些方面的剩余创造性通过“栅栏”体系自动转换了知识。如果您的限制体系做一变动的话,您们的观点就十分接近了。

CHOMSKY: Well, the reason for what he describes, I think, is different. Again, I'm oversimplifying. We have more possible sciences available intellectually. When we try out those intellectual constructions in a changing world of fact, we will not find cumulative growth. What we will find are strange leaps: here is a domain of phenomena, a certain science applies very nicely; now slightly broaden the range of phenomena, then another science, which is very different, happens to apply very beautifully, perhaps leaving out some of these other phenomena. Okay, that's scientific progress and that leads to the omission or forgetting of certain domains. But I think the reason for this is precisely this set of principles, which unfortunately, we don't know, which makes the whole discussion rather abstract, which defines for us what is a possible intellectual structure, a possible deep-science, if you like.

乔姆斯基:我认为这些理由是不同的。我讲得过于简单了。很多的可实现的科学在理智在是可以理解的。当我们在一个千变万化的世界里检验精神结构时,我们得不到累积的增长,却得到奇怪的距离:对某些现象解释得极好,但对某些现象又解释不了。有些人忘记了这些。这是科学进步的一部分,同时也导致了遗漏或遗忘某些领域。这个过程的原因恰恰就是原则的总体。不幸的是我们还不了解这个总体,这使得所有的确定结构讨化,一个深奥的科学讨论变得十分抽象。

ELDERS: Well, let's move over now to the second part of the discussion, to politics. First of all I would like to ask Mr. Foucault why he is so interested in politics, because he told me that in fact he likes politics much more than philosophy.

埃勒德:让我们过渡到讨论会的第二部分:政治。首先我想问下福柯先生,这是您对我说过的,为什么您对政治和哲学倾注了同样的热情?

FOUCAULT: I've never concerned myself, in any case, with philosophy. But that is not a problem. [He laughs.]

我从未搞过哲学,但问题不在这儿。

Your question is: why am I so interested in politics? But if I were to answer you very simply, I would say this: why shouldn't I be interested? That is to say, what blindness, what deafness, what density of ideology would have to weigh me down to prevent me from being interested in what is probably the most crucial subject to our existence, that is to say the society in which we live, the economic relations within which it functions, and the system of power which defines the regular forms and the regular permissions and prohibitions of our conduct. The essence of our life consists, after all, of the political functioning of the society in which we find ourselves.

您的问题是:为什么我也非常热衷于政治?为了简捷地回答您,我说:为什么我不能热衷于它?什么样的聋哑、失明,什么样林林总总的思想体系能有权阻止我对我们最重要的生存问题的关注呢?这是我们生活于其中的社会,在其中运行经济关系并确定合法形式、决定我们行为准则的体制。我们生活的至关重要的焦点是我们所在社会的政治运作。

So I can't answer the question of why I should be interested; I could only answer it by asking why shouldn't I be interested?

同样我也无法回答关于我为什么对此热心投入的问题。我只能以为什么我不应对此热衷来回答您。

ELDERS: You are obliged to be interested, isn't that so?

埃勒德:您不得不热衷于此,是这样的吗?

FOUCAULT: Yes, at least, there isn't anything odd here which is worth question or answer. Not to be interested in politics, that's what constitutes a problem. So instead of asking me, you should ask someone who is not interested in politics and then your question would be well-founded, and you would have the right to say "Why, damn it, are you not interested?" [They laugh and the audience laughs.]

福柯:是的,至少如此。对于值得探讨的问题这没有什么好奇怪的。对政治无动于衷这会是个真正的问题。去对一个不关心政治的人提此问题吧,而不要对我。那样您有权对他高声问道:“怎么,您对此不感兴趣?”

ELDERS: Well, yes, perhaps. Mr. Chomsky, we are all very interested to know your political objectives, especially in relation to your well-known anarcho-syndicalism or, as you formulated it, libertarian socialism. What are the most important goals of your libertarian socialism?

埃勒德:是的,可能会这样。乔姆斯基先生,我们所有人都特别想了解您的政治目标,尤其是同无政府工团主义的关系,或者就像您亲自下的定义那样,您同自由社会主义的关系。它的主要目标是什么呢?

CHOMSKY: I'll overcome the urge to answer the earlier very interesting question that you asked me and turn to this one.

乔姆斯基:我忍痛割爱先不回答您前一个问题,这是个非常有意思的问题。我先回答现在这个问题。

Let me begin by referring to something that we have already discussed, that is, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximise the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue.

首先我要谈一个我们已经说过的话题。如果我没有搞错的话,那就是人性的一个基本要素是对创造性劳动的需要,对创造性研究的需要,对没有强制法规专横限制的自由创造的需要,由此产生的一个情理社会应能最大限度地提供实现人类基本特性的可能性。这意味着要战胜压抑、压迫、破坏、限制诸因素,它们存在于所有的社会中,像历史垃圾一样存在于我们的社会之中。

Now any form of coercion or repression, any form of autocratic control of some domain of existence, let's say, private ownership of capital or state control of some aspects of human life, any such autocratic restriction on some area of human endeavour, can be justified, if at all, only in terms of the need for subsistence, or the need for survival, or the need for defence against some horrible fate or something of that sort. It cannot be justified intrinsically. Rather it must be overcome and eliminated.

所有生存领域里的强制、压抑和专制控制的形式,比如资本的私有或国家在某些方面对人类生活的控制,所有强有加于人类活动的限制,只有当它们仅是根据生存需要或与恐怖命运抗争时才能是合法的。它不可能本质性地合法,还不如将它摒弃。

And I think that, at least in the technologically advanced societies of the West we are now certainly in a position where meaningless drudgery can very largely be eliminated, and to the marginal extent that it's necessary, can be shared among the population; where centralised autocratic control of, in the first place, economic institutions, by which I mean either private capitalism or state totalitarianism or the various mixed forms of state capitalism that exist here and there, has become a destructive vestige of history.

我想,至少在科技方面比较先进的西方社会里,我们能够避免这些无用的、令人不快的需要。在某些范围内,可以同人民分享特权。经济体制的中央专制控制——我所指的既是私营资本主义也是国家极权政体,还包括那些分布在各处的国家资本主义五花八门的混杂形式——这些已成为历史的破坏性残渣余孽。

They are all vestiges that have to be overthrown, eliminated in favour of direct participation in the form of workers' councils or other free associations that individuals will constitute themselves for the purpose of their social existence and their productive labour.

所有这些残余都应被清除以利于劳工委员会或自由结合式的直接参与,这是个体在他们社会生活范围和生产劳动范围内的自己的组织。

Now a federated, decentralised system of free associations, incorporating economic as well as other social institutions, would be what I refer to as anarcho-syndicalism; and it seems to me that this is the appropriate form of social organisation for an advanced technological society, in which human beings do not have to be forced into the position of tools, of cogs in the machine. There is no longer any social necessity for human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that can be overcome and we must overcome it by a society of freedom and free association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will.

一个联邦的、分散的自由结合的体制在吸收了经济和社会的规章后就会构成被我所称的无政府工团主义。我觉得对于一个先进的科技社会,这是适合社会结构的形式。在这样的社会里,人类个体不会被变成工具、机械的齿轮。不再有把人类个体当成生产线上的链环的社会需要(本文由微信公众号“慧田哲学”推送)。我们应该通过一个自由的社会和一个自由结合的社会来达到这一目的。在这样的社会里,人性固有的创造冲动能够以它自己界定的方式得以充分实现。

And again, like Mr. Foucault, I don't see how any human being can fail to be interested in this question. [Foucault laughs.]

重申一下,正如福柯先生所说,我不清楚一个人怎么能对这个问题无动于衷。

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